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Case Comment 
Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police: a re-interpretation 
by the Supreme Court  
 
The existence of a duty of care is central to the law of negligence. The Supreme 
Court has taken the opportunity to clarify the position of the police with regard 
to when they will owe a duty of care and, at the same time, to re-formulate the 
approach to be taken in determining a duty of care.    
Facts    
On the afternoon of Tuesday 29 July 2008, Mrs Robinson was walking along a 
moderately busy street in Huddersfield. The 76 year old, who was later described 
by the Supreme Court as “relatively frail”,1 became embroiled with the arrest by 
the police of a suspected drug dealer. Just as she passed the suspect, and whilst 
she was within approximately one metre of him, two police officers moved towards 
the suspect and took hold of him in order to effect an arrest. The suspect resisted 
arrest and a tussle followed. This resulted in the suspect backing on to Mrs 
Robinson and knocking her over. The two policemen and the suspect then fell on 
top of Mrs Robinson. As a result Mrs Robinson suffered significant physical injuries.  
Mrs Robinson brought an action in negligence against the police. The principal 
question at issue was whether the police officers involved in the arrest owed Mrs 
Robinson a duty of care. The secondary question was whether, if a duty of care 
was owed, the police officers were in breach of that duty of care. The trial judge 
found that the police officer who had initiated the arrest was negligent but that 
the immunity from suit for police officers that existed in the apprehension of 
criminals, established by case law, applied and the claim should therefore be 
dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeal had held that the police in these 
circumstances owed no duty of care, owing to the application of public policy 
considerations. The Court of Appeal had applied the tripartite test formulated in 
Caparo Industries v Dickman2 and found that it would not be fair, just and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care on police officers when they were carrying 
out their role of investigation and suppression of crime and apprehending 
offenders. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning was that the interests of the public at 
large, in having drug dealers removed from the streets, outweighed the interests 
of the individual who had been allegedly wronged. Mrs Robinson appealed to the 
UK Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court Decision  
                                                            
1 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4; [2018] 2 WLR 595  per Lord Reed at para 
1 
2 Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990]  2 AC  605 
Lord Reed gave the judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court. He identified 
the main issues as being (1) whether “the Caparo test” always applies to the 
question of whether a duty of care exists in any given case (note the use of the 
phrase “the Caparo test” rather than the tripartite test which is later rejected by 
the majority of the Supreme Court in its judgment); (2) the extent of any duty of 
care that is owed by the police in their functions and whether the law distinguishes 
between acts and omissions of the police; (3) if the law does distinguish between 
acts or omissions, which category the case before the court fell into; (4) whether 
the police officers owed a duty of care to Mrs Robinson; and (5) if there was a 
duty of care owed, whether the requisite causal connection existed between Mrs 
Robinson’s injuries and the breach.   
Although this case raised important questions about the scope of the duty of care 
owed by the police, significantly Lord Reed identified the case as raising no new 
area in law where the Court had to determine whether a duty of care should be 
recognised. This was not a novel situation; the Court was not required to consider 
an extension of the law of negligence. This laid the foundations for the approach 
Lord Reed proceeded to take. In his view, it was simply a case of personal injury 
and it required, therefore, simply the application of long established principles of 
the law of negligence to the facts. Lord Reed distinguished between cases where 
what is in question is the duty of care police owe to avoid causing physical harm 
in accordance with ordinary principles of negligence and where what is in question 
is a possible common law duty of care owed by the police to protect individuals 
against harm caused by criminals. Lord Reed takes this opportunity to clarify the 
judgment in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire.3 Hill had been applied in a 
number of subsequent judgments4 to refute a duty of care on the part of the police 
in their investigation and suppression of crime, on the basis of an immunity of the 
police based on public policy considerations. Lord Reed stated that Lord Keith in 
Hill had been misunderstood. Lord Keith in Hill had in fact recognised that the 
police could be liable in negligence like anyone else, on the basis of the common 
law duty of care to avoid causing reasonably foreseeable injury to persons or 
property. So it is clarified by Lord Reed that Lord Keith in Hill in fact referred to 
the two types of tortious liability that Lord Reed identified: what could be referred 
to as regular negligence liability that arises as for any person; and negligence 
liability to individual members of the public that arises in performance by the police 
of their investigative functions, for failure to protect members of the public from 
harm caused by criminals. Lord Reed emphasised that, of these two types of 
negligence liability, Lord Keith was only referring to the latter when he applied to 
the police what Lord Keith referred to as ‘an immunity’. However, according to 
Lord Reed, it was actually simply the absence of a duty of care rather than an 
immunity. The rejection of liability in the latter type of case was, Lord Reed said, 
                                                            
3 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 
4 Such as Elguzouli‐Daf v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] Q.B. 335; Brooks v Commissioner of 
Police of the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24; [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1495;  Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] 
UKHL 50; [2009] AC 225  
simply the application of the common law rules which do not impose liability for a 
failure to prevent harm caused by third parties (an omission), unless special 
circumstances exist such as an assumption of responsibility.5  In support of this 
view Lord Reed referred to Lord Toulson’s judgment in Michael v Chief Constable 
of South Wales Police.6 Lord Toulson in Michael had rejected the police immunity 
approach of Hill and had also sought to rely on already existing common law 
principles.  
Lord Reed explained that, at the time Hill was decided, the two-stage test imposed 
by the case of Anns v Merton London Borough Council7 meant that Lord Keith in 
Hill had to use policy considerations at the second stage of the two-stage test to 
reject a duty of care owed by the police to protect individuals against harm caused 
by criminals. However, “the return to orthodoxy”8 in the shape of Stovin v Wise9 
and Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council,10 where it was clarified 
that a public law duty or power did not create a common law duty of care to 
members of the public to confer the benefit of protection from harm, meant that 
the basis for rejecting such a duty of care could cease to be public policy and 
instead be a general principle of the law of negligence; the omissions principle. 
The situation of Mrs Robinson however, dealt with a positive act of the police where 
it was reasonably foreseeable that carelessness in the way the policemen arrested 
the suspect would directly result in Mrs Robinson being physically injured. This 
was an example of the regular negligence liability that arises as for any person. 
The police officers thus owed Mrs Robinson a duty of care and the causal 
connection existed. 
Lord Mance and Lord Hughes dissented as to the reasons why a duty of care 
existed in the case before the Court, but what was particularly significant was their 
view of the role of public policy in the liability of the police in negligence. Whereas 
the majority downplayed the significance of the role of policy in this area, both 
Lord Mance and Lord Hughes thought that public policy had played a significant 
role in the decisions on the extent of police liability under the law of tort and that 
it was primarily policy considerations that shaped the denial of a duty of care owed 
by the police to the public in the investigation and suppression of crime.       
As well as the majority of the Supreme Court in Robinson putting to bed any 
suggestion that policy has or needs to play a part in the question of police liability 
in negligence, the Court also made obiter comments clarifying the approach that 
should be taken when a court is faced with a novel case that requires consideration 
                                                            
5 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4; [2018] 2 WLR 595  per Lord Reed at para 
70 
6 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police (Refuge and others intervening) [2015]  UKSC 2; [2015] AC 
1732 
7 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 
8 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4; [2018] 2 WLR 595  per Lord Reed at para 
31  
9 Stovin v Wise [ 1996] AC 923 
10 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council  [2004] UKHL 15;  [2004] 1 WLR 1057  
of whether a duty of care exists. There is no such thing as a tripartite test that 
was created by Lord Bridge in the case of Caparo Industries v Dickman. Caparo 
has been misunderstood. In support of this fairly radical position Lord Reed 
pointed out that Lord Bridge himself in Caparo did not intend to lay down a single 
test or principle to apply to determine if a duty of care is owed. The three elements 
of the tripartite test were recognised by Lord Bridge as just “convenient labels” 
that were not open to precise definition.11 Lord Reed then went on to state that it 
“…was made clear in Michael that the idea that Caparo established a tripartite test 
is mistaken”.12 Rather, Lord Reed emphasised that part of Lord Bridge’s judgment 
in Caparo which referred to incremental development of the duty of care; using 
precedent to guide the development of the law. Lord Reed thus stated that, in 
novel cases, courts should look at those already existing cases with the closest 
analogies and use these to determine the existence of a duty of care, also taking 
into account the reasons for and against imposing liability, in order to determine 
if it is just and reasonable to impose a duty of care in the novel situation.  
Commentary 
Although an English case, the majority judgment in Robinson was given by one of 
the Scottish Justices, Lord Reed, and being that this area of the law of tort is 
effectively the same as the Scottish law of delict, the decision is both highly 
persuasive on lower Scottish courts and, perhaps more importantly, signposts the 
way in which future Scottish appeals will be dealt with by the Supreme Court.  
Lord Reed has gone back to basics and rooted the thorny question of police liability 
in negligence in the ordinary common law principles of tort law. By rejecting the 
existence of the tripartite test, refusing to identify this genre of case as a novel 
category, and by explaining Lord Keith’s reliance on immunity and public policy in 
Hill, the Supreme Court manages to remove both public policy considerations and 
immunity from the vocabulary used in police negligence liability cases. This is a 
clear divergence from the past but not altogether surprising as the stage had been 
set by Lord Toulson in Michael.13 The judgment in Robinson nevertheless seeks to 
end the argument for police tortious liability to individual members of the public 
for failure to protect them from harm caused by criminals, once and for all, by 
basing the rejection of liability on well-established legal principle rather than 
policy. Any redress in this area must now be sought through an individual’s 
assertion of their human rights under the Human Rights Act 1998,14 under which 
                                                            
11 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4; [2018] 2 WLR 595  per Lord Reed at para 
24  
12 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4; [2018] 2 WLR 595  per Lord Reed at para 
28  
13 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police (Refuge and others intervening) [2015]  UKSC 2; [2015] AC 
1732 
14 See the recent Supreme Court decision of Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD and another 
[2018] UKSC11   
the remedy that is available for a breach of one’s human rights is quite different 
from compensation for negligence.15  
The omissions rule that was seized on by Lord Toulson in Michael16 has in Robinson 
been further justified and focussed into the rule against liability for the actions of 
third parties and for danger which the police have not themselves created. The 
basis for non-liability in negligence of the fire service in Scotland is also based 
upon the principle of non-liability for omissions.17 The reliance on the omissions 
principle as the basis for rejecting a duty of care owed by the fire service has 
however been criticised.18 Lord Hughes in Robinson argues that the omissions rule 
is not the only or a sufficient reason for not imposing a duty of care by the police 
in the investigation and suppression of crime.19 He provides by way of example, 
the absence of a duty to individuals in the manner in which police investigations 
are conducted.20 Both Lord Hughes and Lord Mance question the majority’s 
reluctance in Robinson to admit the role policy has played in this area to date. So 
why has the Supreme Court down played the role of policy in this area and relied 
instead on what they insist are applicable established principles of the law of 
negligence? Perhaps the Supreme Court thinks it is more palatable for the public 
to accept if rooted in the law rather than policy? There has been criticism of the 
policy basis in the past.21 Ironically though, in order to make it look less like the 
courts simply apply policy to cases in order to achieve the desired end result and 
more like they apply well settled law, the Supreme Court has just exercised a 
considerable amount of judicial re-interpretation and, in so doing, has rather 
shaken up the foundations for determining the existence of a duty of care in 
negligence.        
The Supreme Court has changed the emphasis to be laid on the judgment in 
Caparo. The tripartite test is not to be used to determine the existence of a duty 
                                                            
15 Human Rights Act 1998, Article 8 – provides for damages to be awarded when required to provide “just 
satisfaction”, so such an award is not automatic and the finding of a violation in itself may be considered to be 
a sufficient remedy. See further Jim Murdoch, Reed and Murdoch: Human Rights Law in Scotland (4th edn, 
Bloomsbury Professional, 2017) at chapter 1. In addition the seriousness of the failings of the police have to be 
particularly marked, needing to amount to a breach of such articles as Article 2 (right to life) or Article 3 
(prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the European Convention of 
Human Rights.    
16 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police (Refuge and others intervening) [2015]  UKSC 2; [2015] AC 
1732 
17 A J Allan (Blairnyle) Limited v Strathclyde Fire Board [2016] CSIH 3; 2016 S.C. 304 
18 For example see Greg Gordon, “ A song of fire and ice: AJ Allan (Blairnyle) Limited & Anor v Strathclyde Fire 
Board” 2017 ELR 122   
19  Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4; [2018] 2 WLR 595 per Lord Hughes at 
para  114 and 118.  
20 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4; [2018] 2 WLR 595 per Lord Hughes at 
para  114. 
21 See criticisms of aspects of the reliance on policy in Claire McIvor, “Getting defensive about police 
negligence: the Hill principle, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the House of Lords”, 2010 CLJ 133; Hanna 
Wilberg, “Defensive practice or conflict of duties? Policy concerns in public authority negligence claims” , 2010 
LQR 420; Jonathan Morgan, “Policy reasoning in tort law: the courts, the Law Commission and the critics”, 
2009 LQR 215 
of care either in situations where a duty is already well established or in novel 
cases.  This approach, it is noted, is of marked contrast to the position that was 
recently taken by the Inner House of the Court of Session in the Scottish case of 
A J Allan (Blairnyle) Limited v Strathclyde Fire Board,22 which raised similar 
questions about the duty of care owed by the fire service. Although the Inner 
House denied the existence of a duty of care owed by the fire service to individual 
members of the public, it clearly applied the tripartite test and public policy 
considerations.23 One wonders where this leaves the convergence of the English 
and Scots law of negligence – there are perhaps signs of some divergence. Though 
there are also some signs of similarity in future direction. Lord Drummond Young 
in his obiter comments in Blairnyle advocates incremental development of the duty 
of care in negligence cases, by analogy with established categories rather than 
what he calls the mechanical application of rules derived from existing case law. 
However he also calls for a greater role for policy to shape that development, 
resulting in a less unified law of negligence but one that would deal more fairly 
with individual cases.24 Although the Supreme Court in Robinson admits a role for 
policy in novel cases in the assessment of whether the existence of a duty of care 
would be just and reasonable, the extent of the role of policy envisaged by the 
Supreme Court under this changed approach to novel cases is yet to be seen.    
 
                                                            
22 A J Allan (Blairnyle) Limited v Strathclyde Fire Board [2016] CSIH 3; 2016 S.C. 304 
23 See A J Allan (Blairnyle) Limited v Strathclyde Fire Board [2016] CSIH 3; 2016 S.C. 304 per Lady Paton at para 
17, 26 and 28. Lord Drummond Young also applies policy considerations – see in particular para 89,  and 
actually advocates a greater role for public policy in determining a duty of care, arguing that it affects the 
application of the proximity test rather than it just being the third consideration of the tripartite test.   
24 A J Allan (Blairnyle) Limited v Strathclyde Fire Board [2016] CSIH 3; 2016 S.C. 304 per Lord Drummond Young 
at para 97. See also Greg Gordon, “ A song of fire and ice: AJ Allan (Blairnyle) Limited & Anor v Strathclyde Fire 
Board” 2017 ELR 122,  who calls for greater transparency in the use of policy in the reasoning for denying a 
duty of care in the law of negligence, and thus a more fine‐tuned application of policy to situations.  
